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Chapter 8 
Adequacy of the overall control system  
 
8.1 Introduction 
Evaluation Question 3 
To what extent has the overall control system of organic farming, from the Commission, 
through Member States competent authorities, control authorities, control bodies to 
accreditation bodies, been adequate to achieve the global objectives of the regulation? 
In answering this question the following aspects needs to be examined in more detail: 
 Supervisory role of the Commission over the Member States control systems; 
 Supervisory role of the Member States over control bodies; 
 Exchange of information between the Commission and the Member States, and within the 
Member States; 
 Adequacy of the annual inspection requirement and application of risk based assessment for 
the nature and frequency of controls of organic operators; 
 Adequacy of distribution of responsibilities among the main actors involved in the control 
system, including application of the accreditation system; 
 Adequacy and justification of the exemptions from the control system, notable regarding the 
retail sector and their application by the Member States. 
In order to ensure that consumers’ confidence in organic products is justified, and thus that 
organic farmers, processors and importers comply with the rules of organic farming, an effective 
control inspection system has to be in place in all Member States. For this reason, specific rules of 
the overall control system were laid down in Council Regulation (EC) 834/2007 (Article 27 to 31). 
As described in Chapter 3, the overall control system consists of two elements: a) the actual 
control of organic operators carried out by private accredited control bodies or designated public 
control authorities and b) the public surveillance system, which encompasses the entire EU 
framework of activities of national competent authorities and accreditation bodies to supervise 
and monitor the organic control system at the level of the control bodies. 
Against this background the aim of Evaluation Question 3 is to understand whether the 
instruments provided by Council Regulation (EC) 834/2007, targeted at the organic control 
system, are adequate for achieving the global objectives of the Regulation, i.e. for ensuring the 
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effective functioning of the internal market, guaranteeing fair competition, ensuring consumer 
confidence and protecting consumer interests. More specifically the aim is to explore whether 
the organic control system is adequate to ensure organic operators’ compliance with the organic 
rules so that the entire organic sector can function. If the overall control system is not effective in 
ensuring full compliance with the rules in all Member States a) fair competition among organic 
farmers within the EU and b) consumers’ confidence in organic products is not guaranteed.  
This chapter is organised as follows: First of all the judgement criteria, the respective indicators 
used and the information basis to answer the evaluation question are described. Subsequently, 
the results from the different evaluation tools and thus the empirical basis for answering the 
evaluation question are presented. Finally, the judgment and conclusion are presented. 
8.2 Approach 
Setting up a control system entails putting in place processes and procedures to monitor and 
verify that the requirements laid down in the EU legislation on organic farming  are fulfilled by 
organic operators in all Member States at all stages of production, processing, import and 
distribution and that they work in practise as intended. This involves, first of all, that the 
procedures foreseen in a control system are adequate and thus reasonably sufficient to allow for 
such verification and monitoring. Secondly, from the perspective of the European Union to 
ensure fair competition and consumer confidence, the control procedures should be 
implemented consistently and effectively to ensure comparable results across all Member States. 
Thus, ‘adequacy’ addresses in this context whether the procedures and processes of the control 
system are reasonably sufficient without being abundant, while ‘effectiveness’ means whether 
the procedures and processes of the control system are suitable to produce the desired outcome. 
Therefore, Evaluation Question 3 was answered on the basis of two underlying judgement 
criteria: 
(1) The control system is (or is not) adequate to ensure organic operators’ compliance with 
the organic production rules 
The prerequisite for a functioning control system that guarantees both fair competition and 
consumer confidence is that the procedures implemented are adequate and effective to 
ensure organic operators’ compliance with the organic production rules. Against this 
background the following aspects were analysed: 
 the adequacy of the annual inspection requirements; 
 the adequacy of the additional risk-based inspections of organic operators; 
 the adequacy and justification of Article 28(2) of Council Regulation (EC) 834/2007, 
which allows Member States to exempt operators that sell products directly to the final 
consumer or user from the control system. 
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The information basis for this judgement criterion builds on interviews with national 
competent authorities and control bodies from 13 Member States, the web-based 
stakeholder survey1, re-analysis of data from the EU-funded research project CERTCOST2 
and the review of scientific literature and public documents. 
(2) The procedures of the control system as described in Article 27-31 of Council Regulation 
(EC) 834/2007 are (or are not) effectively implemented in Member States 
To ensure fair competition for organic operators on the one hand and to guarantee 
consumers’ trust on the other, in each Member State the control system needs to be 
consistently and effectively implemented. Therefore, the following aspects were analysed: 
 the level of harmonization/consistency in the Member State’s procedures for setting-up 
national control systems and the differences in the control procedures; 
 the adequacy of distribution of responsibilities among the main actors involved in the 
control system, including application of the accreditation system; 
 the public surveillance system in place supervising the functioning and quality of the 
organic control system; 
 the exchange of information between the Commission and the Member States, and 
within the Member States; 
 consumers’ trust in the procedures of the organic control system and in the actors of the 
organic sector. 
The information basis used to analyse the effectiveness of procedures of the control system 
consists of documentary analyses (cross-country comparison) of the control procedures 
implemented and interviews with national competent authorities and control bodies from 13 
Member States, the case study results from the ’Gatto con gli stivali‘ fraud case, the review of 
relevant public documents and scientific literature, the consumer survey, and the web-based 
stakeholder survey.  
The evaluation question examines the adequacy and effectiveness of the control system primarily 
on the basis of experiences of actors involved in the overall control system. Possible limitations 
through stakeholder biases were minimised by involving all stakeholder groups of the organic 
control system (see also House, 2003).  
                                                     
1  The survey was responded by 265 European stakeholders mainly from Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Austria, the 
Czech Republic, Belgium, France and the Netherlands. More details about the web-based survey are given in Chapter 
1.2. 
2  The CERTCOST-project was carried out under the EU’s Seventh Framework Programme for Research. The overall 
objective of the project has been to provide recommendations to improve the organic food certification systems in 
Europe in terms of efficiency, transparency, and cost effectiveness. The reason for this has been the need for a 
strengthened competitiveness of the European organic food sector by means of reducing incidence of non-compliance 
and thereby increases consumers' trust. 
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8.3 Results 
8.3.1 Adequacy of the control system to ensure compliance 
Adequacy of the annual inspection requirements 
Findings from the analysis of provisions 
Article 27(3) of Council Regulation (EC) 834/2007 specifies that all organic operators shall be 
subject to a verification of compliance at least once a year (exemptions are possible for 
wholesalers dealing only with packaged products and operators selling to the final consumer or 
user as described in Article 28(2)). Control authorities or control bodies shall carry out at least 
once a year a physical inspection of all operators (Article 65(1) of Council Regulation (EC) 
889/2008). 
It is worthwhile noting that other areas work with considerably lower control frequencies. For 
example, the EU legal framework for the rural development programmes requires annual on-the-
spot checks of at least 5 % of all beneficiaries3 (which could be halved under certain conditions).4 
Views of stakeholders 
As shown in Table 8.1, stakeholder surveyed found mandatory annual inspections to be an 
important measure to ensure fair competition among organic operators (mean 2.2)5. There are 
no big differences in the opinions of the different stakeholder groups. As far as mandatory annual 
inspections are concerned, control bodies/control authorities, competent authorities, processors 
and organic operator organisations are slightly more positive (mean >2.2) than importers and 
retailers (mean <1.8). Furthermore, most stakeholders perceive mandatory annual inspections as 
an important measure to ensure consumer confidence in organic products (mean 2.0). This was 
particularly stressed by stakeholders from Denmark and the United Kingdom; but to less extent 
by stakeholders from Poland. 
                                                     
3  Article 12 of Commission Regulation (EC) 1975/2006 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council 
Regulation (EC) 1698/2005. 
4  To put the frequency of organic controls in the context of food safety controls (which aim to control microbiological 
and chemical hazards in the supply chain and, thereby, minimise the risk to consumers’ health), two illustrative 
examples are given here: the German federal state ‘Baden-Württemberg’ controlled 3.7 % of the farms and 36 - 43 % of 
other actors of the food chain (MLRV Baden Württemberg, 2012) in 2011. In the United Kingdom, hygiene controls 
were conducted on 49 % of the milk producing holdings and on 25 % of the egg production sites (Food Standards 
Agency, 2012). 
5  Measured on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from +3 (total agreement) to -3 (total disagreement). 
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Table 8.1: Views of stakeholders regarding the importance of annual inspections and 
additional risk-based inspections to ensure fair competition (mean values) 
 
Source:  Own data from web-based stakeholder survey. 
Scientific evidences 
Zorn et al. (2010) analysed the control frequency in Germany based on data from 2006 of nine 
organic control bodies. Each operator was subject of 1.14 controls per year (announced and 
unannounced controls). However, the control frequency per operator varied considerably 
between the control bodies and between operators. Their analysis shows that in 2006, German 
producers have been controlled less frequently than processors and with a similar frequency as 
importers. The average control visits were between 1.00 and 1.22 controls per year for 
producers, between 1.09 and 1.32 controls per year for processor and between 1.00 and 1.21 
controls per year for importers. Therefore, control bodies comply with the requirements of the 
Regulation of at least one annual control plus additional random control. Given the German 
default frequency of additional random controls of 10 %, two control bodies achieved less than 
1.10 annual control visits per operator (Zorn et al., 2010). 
Within the CERTCOST-project, the number of control visits was collected from five organic control 
bodies and/or control authorities from the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Italy and the 
United Kingdom (one control body/control authority per country). Table 8.2 shows the average 
number of annual control visits (announced and unannounced) per operator for the years 
2007 -2009. The average number of annual control visits varies between the five countries: they 
were lowest in the Czech Republic (average 1.01 - 1.05 annual control visits per operator) and 
Denmark (average 1.02 - 1.04 annual control visits per operator) and highest in Italy (average 
1.44 - 1.56 annual control visits per operator). Thus, in the Czech Republic and in Denmark, 
additional random controls are below 5 % while in Italy on the other hand around 50 % of the 
operators were additionally randomly visited. Contrary to the results of Zorn et al. (2010) from 
Mean value n Mean value n
Producer 2.0 16 2.4 16
Processor 2.3 9 2.4 9
Retailer 1.8 18 1.9 18
Importer 1.7 17 2.0 17
Organic Operator Organisations 2.2 33 2.2 33
Control Body/Control Authority 2.5 54 2.3 54
Competent Authority 2.2 22 2.1 22
Governmental Authority 1.9 16 2.1 16
Total 2.2 205 2.3 205
Question: How important are the following measures of the control system to ensure fair competition among organic operators 
(producers, processors etc.)?  (Measured on a 7-point Lickert scale, +3 = total agreement; 0 = neutral; -3 = total disagreement)
Mandatory annual inspection Additional risk-oriented
of organic operators inspections
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nine German control bodies (2006 data), 2007-2009 data collected from one German control 
body in the CERTCOST-project showed that German producers were visited more frequently than 
processors and importers. In Italy on the other hand importers were more frequently controlled 
than processors and producers. 
Table 8.2: Average number of control visits of organic control bodies and control authorities 
per operator and year (one control body/control authority per country) 
 
Source:  Own analysis based on data from one control body or control authority per country collected in the CERTCOST-
project (Moschitz et al., 2009). 
Albersmeier et al. (2009) suggested varying auditing intervals, auditing depth, unannounced spot 
checks of risk-based approaches superior to standard control procedures to ensure non-
opportunistic behaviour of operators. Several authors propose using specific approaches (moral 
hazard theory, statistic approaches) to determine optimum control intensities and thus risk-
based inspections (Hirschauer, 2004; Albertsmeier et al., 2010; Dabbert, 2011).  
Adequacy of the control system is also determined by the cost of the system. Stolze et al. (2012) 
calculated in the CERTCOST-project the whole range from the certification fees to opportunity 
costs of organic operators and the administrative costs at the various levels of farmers and 
Germany
2007 1.07 1.07 1.04 1.06
2008 1.16 1.19 1.06 1.10
2009 1.24 1.27 1.08 1.05
Czech Republic
2007 1.01 1.01 n.d. n.d.
2008 1.02 1.02 n.d. n.d.
2009 1.05 1.06 1.03 1.13
Denmark
2007 1.04 1.04 n.d. n.d.
2008 1.02 1.02 n.d. n.d.
2009 1.03 1.30 n.d. n.d.
Italy
2007 1.50 1.49 1.53 3.00
2008 1.56 1.55 1.60 2.90
2009 1.44 1.43 1.50 3.60
United Kingdom
2007 1.12 1.14 1.10 1.16
2008 1.16 1.17 1.14 1.20
2009 1.12 1.30 1.09 1.11
Total number of operators from the five control bodies: 2007: 15 586, 2008: 15 915, 2009: 17 796; Germany: 80 % producer,
16 % processor, 4 % importer; Czech Republic: 2007 – 2008 only producer, 2009: 86.5 % producer, 12 % processor, 1.5 % im-
porter; Italy: 84.8 % producer, 15 % processor, 0.2 % importer; UK: 55 % producer, 38 % processor, 7 % importer; Denmark: 
only producer; n.d. = no data
Total Producers Processors Importers
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processors, standard owners, competent authorities and the control bodies. Results revealed 
that with respect to the certification cost, the inspection fee is the most relevant monetary 
expenditure for organic operators (on average 900-1 000 EUR per farm). It corresponds to a share 
of up to 0.4 % of the raw income6 of a farm and up to 1 % of the organic turnover of processors. 
Since the major cost item of control bodies depends on the number of on-site controls and 
thereto connected office work7, the authors conclude that the costs of certification could be 
reduced by reducing the cost for the on-site control visit and thus the corresponding control fee 
(e.g. by strengthening risk-based control systems). Dabbert (2011) concluded on the basis of the 
results from the CERTCOST-project that once effective risk-based control systems have been 
implemented, the Commission could consider lowering the inspection frequency for proven low-
risk operators. 
Marketing literature suggests that consumer trust in certification or control systems is crucial 
particularly for organic products (Jahn et al., 2005). Consumer trust is however a 
multidimensional and dynamic construct, which is determined by the perceived strictness of 
standards and controls, domestic origin of the product and familiarity with the organic label. 
While organic labels signal to the consumer that compliance with the Regulation is ensured 
through regular inspections (Janssen and Hamm, 2011; Stolz et al., 2011), no research results 
were found showing, which control frequency consumers perceive to be adequate. As Janssen 
and Hamm (2012) pointed out, consumers have in general rather limited knowledge about 
organic production standards and the organic control system.  
  
                                                     
6  Raw income is calculated as revenues minus variable and fixed costs, however, without the imputed labour costs of the 
farm family. 
7  According to Stolze et al. (2012), control bodies dedicate 44 % (median) of the total time spent on certification to on-
site controls, whereby the values varied considerably. Furthermore, preparatory work and work after the inspection 
visit in terms of processing records amount around 30 % of the control bodies’ workload. 
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Adequacy of the additional risk-based inspections 
Findings from the analysis of provisions 
According to Article 27(3) of Council Regulation (EC) 834/2007, the nature and frequency of the 
controls shall be determined on the basis of an assessment of the risk of occurrence of 
irregularities and infringements. Control authorities or control bodies shall carry out random 
control visits, primarily unannounced, based on the general evaluation of the risk of non-
compliance with the organic production rules, taking into account at least the results of previous 
controls, the quantity of products concerned and the risk for exchange of products (Article 65(4) 
of Council Regulation (EC) 889/2008). 
The document analysis conducted in the 13 case study countries showed that so far only Austria, 
Estonia, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands have national guidelines for risk-based inspections 
or criteria respectively. Thus mandatory risk-based controls are carried out differently across 
Member States. 
Views of stakeholders 
Stakeholders responding to the stakeholder survey expressed that additional risk-based 
inspections are important to ensure fair competition among organic operators (see Table 8.1). 
Producers, processors and control bodies/control authorities consider additional risk-based 
inspections slightly more important (mean >2.3) than retailers and importers (mean <2.0). Asking 
for areas which could improve the effectiveness of the control system, 15 % of the respondents 
(a total of 164 stakeholders responded to this question) suggested additional risk-based controls. 
This was particularly mentioned by control bodies (5), traders (4), competent authorities (3), and 
organic operator organisations (3) and by German (7) and Italian stakeholders (4).  
Scientific evidence 
The objective of a risk-based inspection approach is to focus resources on risky operators with 
regards to the frequency and intensity of controls (Alderman and Tabor, 1989). Conversely, these 
risk-based inspections can also be used to identify low risk operators. While so far risk-based 
control systems are largely based on qualitative approaches (Dabbert, 2011), there are a number 
of studies analysing the use of alternative approaches for estimating the risk potential of organic 
operators. Hirschauer (2004) proposes using the moral-hazard theory to establish models for the 
determination of optimum control intensities. In contrast to this, Dabbert (2011) and Gambelli et 
al. (2012) consider quantitative approaches to enhance the effectiveness and the usefulness of 
qualitative risk-based approaches. Their analysis provided evidence that the probability of non-
compliance is higher for operators who have already been non-compliant. Furthermore, they 
found farm size, complexity of operations and presence of pig and poultry production to be 
determinant for slight non-compliances. However, they consider data collected so far from 
control bodies (e.g. structural data from organic operators) insufficient for risk-based inspections 
(Dabbert, 2011). Gambelli et al. (2012) concluded that based on currently available data a risk-
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based inspection strategy is quite difficult to implement. Therefore, the results from the 
CERTCOST-project suggest including personal information about operators (e.g. age of operators, 
enterprise type, total turnover, liabilities and debt, solvency) additionally to the already collected 
data (Dabbert, 2011; Gambelli et al., 2012). Zorn et al. (2013) stress that organic operator’s 
personal financial situation and that of his operation could also influence his compliance 
behaviour: operators with serious liquidity problems will be more inclined to be dishonest. 
However, any approach to collect more detailed data about the operators would need to take the 
data protection legal framework of the EU into account as expressed in the charter of 
fundamental rights of the European Union (European Union, 2010).   
Based on comprehensive calculations on the total cost of organic certification, Stolze et al. 
(2012) concluded that reducing the number of control visits per operator by introducing risk-
based inspection could reduce the certification costs considerably.  
Albersmeier et al. (2009) state that the risk-based approach contrasts sharply with some of the 
expectations in agribusiness that auditing should be more standardized and equal across all 
operators. They consider risk-based approaches to be useful to ensure non-opportunistic 
behaviour of operators. However, this approach requires additional skills and competences from 
control authorities/bodies since different auditing intervals, auditing depth, unannounced spot 
checks and differentiated auditing focuses are needed. Therefore, it is necessary to provide 
specific training for control body staff carrying out risk-based controls (Albersmeier et al., 2009). 
Zorn et al. (2013) highlight that applying more sophisticated risk analysis tools requires technical 
and methodological skills which are so far not available to control bodies but could be provided 
by external technical services. 
Findings from the review of relevant publications 
Similar conclusions were also drawn by Maresca et al. (2013). They concluded in the EU-project 
IRM-ORGANIC8 that a more risk-based and investigative control system would require a mix of 
measures including unannounced inspections, quick follow-up in case of non-conformities, use of 
cross-checks by the control bodies, and targeted sampling and testing. This mix of control 
measures however requires an improved training of inspection staff.  
                                                     
8  The IRM-ORGANIC-project (Training on improved risk management tools for organic inspectors) aims to facilitate an 
open-minded exchange between control bodies in Europe on state-of-the-art inspection methodologies and techniques 
to optimize consumer protection and fair competition on the emerging green market for products from organic 
farming. It is funded by the EU Leonardo Da Vinci – Lifelong Learning Programme. 
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Adequacy and justification of Article 28(2) of Council Regulation (EC) 834/2007 which allows 
Member States to exempt operators who sell products directly to the final consumer or user 
from the control system 
Findings from the analysis of provisions 
Article 28(2) of Council Regulation (EC) 834/2007 enables Member States to exempt operators 
who sell products directly to the final consumer or user from the control system if these 
operators do not produce, process, pack, label or store organic products elsewhere, do not 
import organic products from third countries and/or outsource these activities to a third party. 
The document analyses of national regulations and other relevant documents showed that in all 
13 case study countries operators selling organic products directly to the final consumer are 
exempted from submission to the control system provided that the operator does not produce, 
prepare, process, store other than in connection with the point of sale, or import such a product 
from a third country, or has not contracted out such activities to a third party. It further showed 
that the interpretation of the conditions for granting the exemptions varies, so that operators 
may be treated differently across Member States.  
Views of stakeholders 
The stakeholder survey showed varying results with respect to the question whether retailers 
should be exempted from the organic control system (see Table 8.3). Producers and control 
bodies/control authorities on the one hand and stakeholders from France and Italy favour to a 
large extent the inclusion of retailers in the organic control system (means >1.6). Stakeholders 
from Denmark on the other hand responded that retailers should not be included in the control 
system (mean -1.8) however without specifying any reasons. Processors and stakeholders from 
the United Kingdom were neutral about this. 
The most important arguments to include retailers in the control system were ensuring consumer 
confidence. Stakeholders consider retailers to take a key role as they are in direct contact with 
the consumers. Therefore, to ensure consumer confidence in organic products, retailers should 
be included in the control system (7 stakeholders, 3 from Austria). Six stakeholders considered 
the risk of incorrect labelling and commingling with non-organic products to be high. 
Furthermore, it was mentioned that the entire organic supply chain should be subject to the 
control system (4 stakeholders) and that retailers should take responsibility when they sell 
organic products (3 stakeholders). 19 stakeholders however (among them 6 control bodies, 3 
competent authorities, 2 national authorities) take the view that retail of packed food should not 
be subject of the control system as there is no risk for commingling and incorrect labelling. 
Retailers should only be included in the control system “…when they sell organic products which 
are not originally packaged by a company covered by the scope of the organic regulation”. Some 
of these stakeholders argued that including retailers of only packed food in the control system 
would increase costs but without giving more security to the consumer. Seven stakeholders 
(among them 3 control bodies) found that the retail sector should be exempted in general. 
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Table 8.3: Views of stakeholders regarding the inclusion of the retail sector in the control 
system (mean values) 
 
Source:  Own data from web-based stakeholder survey. 
Findings from the review of relevant publications 
There is one study analysing the 2005 to 2011 inspection data from 1 025 inspections of retailers 
with processing operations from Germany. According to this study (Neuendorff, 2012), so far no 
information on severe infringements and fraud cases concerning the exempted retail operations 
is available. Neuendorff (2012) considers the risk of non-compliances with the production and 
labelling rules of the EU legislation on organic production to be quite low if retail operations only 
deal with packed and labelled food because the risk of commingling with conventional products 
and incorrect labelling is low.   
Neuendorff (2012) shows that written warnings needed to be issued only in a limited number of 
cases and no references to the organic production needed to be withdrawn and no prohibition of 
marketing the organic products were issued. On the basis of these results, Neuendorff (2012) 
defined the following risk categories for not exempted processing operations in the retail sector: 
 Low risk: off-baking of bread, roasting and grinding of coffee, selling of organic drinks; 
 Medium risk: portioning and packing of organic cheese, meat and sausages, preparation of 
mincemeat; 
 Enhanced risk: preparation of organic salads, organic snack food; 
n
Producer 1.7 16
Processor 0.2 9
Retailer 1.2 17
Importer 0.8 16
Organic operator organisation 0.9 33
Control body / control authority 1.6 50
Competent authority 1.0 20
Governmental authority 1.1 16
Germany 1.2 54
Denmark -1.8 5
France 2.1 10
Italy 1.7 27
United Kingdom 0 13
Czech Republic 1.4 14
Poland 0.7 6
Total 1.3 198
Mean value
Question: Please indicate the degree of your personal agreement to the following statement: "The retail sector should be fully 
included in the control system."  (7-point Lickert scale, +3 = total agreement; 0 = neutral; -3 = total disagreement)
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and suggested introducing a risk-based inspection approach for processing operations in the 
retail sector. 
Based on the experience of a German control body, Neuendorff (2013) reported that some 
retailers undertook a preparation activity (crisped organic bread in their retail outlet) without 
notifying it to the competent authorities. This suggests that the exemption from the control 
system is only justified if the conditions for granting it are periodically verified.  
8.3.2 Effectiveness of the implemented control system in Member States 
Consistency in the Member State’s procedures of setting-up national control systems and the 
differences in the control procedures 
Findings from the analysis of provisions 
The document analysis conducted in the 13 case study countries revealed that only Denmark, 
Germany, Italy and Slovenia statutorily regulate residue sampling and analysis of organic 
products. In the United Kingdom, national testing procedures for organic food are currently being 
developed. In Member States without statutorily regulated residue sampling and analysis 
approaches, each control body has its own procedures with respect to the number of analyses 
and the maximum threshold to evaluate the level of contamination, to assess the level of 
corresponding sanctions, and to determine if the products should be declassified or whether the 
certificate should be withdrawn from the operator.  
The document analysis showed further that only four of 13 Member States have a common 
catalogue for issuing of sanctions: Germany (German Regulation on approval of control), Estonia 
(not very detailed), the Czech Republic (Act. No. 242/2000), and the Netherlands (SKAL sanction 
regulation R14). In Italy, the national accreditation body provides a classification of non-
compliance and sanction. France, Poland and the United Kingdom are currently developing 
sanction catalogues or plan to do so soon respectively. In Austria, the regional federal 
government of Vorarlberg urge the compilation of a standardized catalogue of sanctions to 
ensure that the different control bodies handle infringements and irregularities equally. As a 
consequence, each control body might define Article 30 in a different way. This leads to 
operators being sanctioned differently for having committed the same infringement (European 
Court of Auditors, 2012). 
Views of stakeholders 
About 44 % of the stakeholders surveyed indicated that there are differences in the effectiveness 
of the control system across Member States. Particularly retailers (agreement 63 %), importers 
(53 %) and control bodies/authorities (51 %) took the view of differences in the effectiveness of 
the control system. In contrast to these stakeholders, the majority of processors (agreement 0 %) 
and national authorities (agreement 25 %) took a different view. From a country perspective, 
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stakeholders from France (90 % agreement) and Denmark (86 %) strongly supported the 
statement of differences in the effectiveness of the control system whereas the majority of the 
Czech stakeholders disagreed (disagreement 36 %) and only 21 % of the stakeholders from the 
United Kingdom (71 % do not know) agreed to this statement. The areas of differences in the 
effectiveness across the Member States are to a large extent similar to the issues raised with 
respect to different interpretation of the control rules.  
The stakeholder survey highlighted the need for a more harmonised control system in the EU. In 
total, 50 % of the stakeholders surveyed indicated that the control rules are interpreted 
differently in the Member States while 32 % did not know. The results varied only marginally 
between the different stakeholder groups. Retailers, control bodies/control authorities, national 
authorities and importers found to a slightly higher extent that the control rules are differently 
interpreted across the Member States (agreement >55 %). However, there were larger 
differences between the stakeholders from different countries: 80 % of the French stakeholders 
and 71 % of the Danish stakeholders but no stakeholder from the Czech Republic (57 % do not 
know) found that control rules are interpreted differently. The following areas where control 
rules are interpreted differently across the Member States were mentioned: residue sampling, 
testing and analysis (15 %; particularly mentioned by control bodies), criteria for risk-based 
approaches (5 %), control frequency (4 %), share of unannounced controls (4 %), issuing of 
sanctions (4 %), and accreditation process for control bodies (4 %). As to the latter, the need for 
harmonisation of control processes with respect to both between accreditation bodies within a 
Member State and between Member States was particularly highlighted by three German 
stakeholder surveyed (two competent authorities, one organic sector organisation). Clear and 
harmonised guidelines for accreditors are suggested to improve harmonisation in accreditation 
procedures. In this respect, a Finish stakeholder suggested to establish only one EU accreditation 
body.  
The need for a more harmonised control system was also expressed in the interviews carried out 
in the case study countries. Nine of 12 competent authorities and 11 of 21 control bodies/control 
authorities interviewed stressed the need for such a harmonisation; notably from the Czech 
Republic, Germany, Denmark, France, Spain, Italy, Poland, and Slovenia. The interviewed control 
bodies/authorities or competent authorities from Austria, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom gave partly contradictory answers. While some control bodies or competent authorities 
in these countries see areas which would need harmonisation, others do not. Additionally to the 
areas already identified in the web-based stakeholder survey, competent authorities and control 
bodies mentioned in the interviews the following areas, where the control system should be 
harmonised across the Member States: information exchange between control authorities or 
control bodies, the management in case of suspicion of infringements and irregularities, 
exemption of retailers according to Article 28 of the Regulation, and non-conformity follow-ups 
and sanctions as well as non-compliance categories. The Standing Committee of Organic Farming 
(SCOF) was considered to be a useful means to harmonise the control system.  
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However, there are also stakeholders voicing the risk that the EU organic farming legislation 
regulates too much and does not leave enough space for effective controls (“regulatory overkill 
should be avoided”). Therefore, a moderate flexibility in the control rules might be required and 
“any initiatives to further harmonise the control system need to be adequate and appropriate”. 
Instead of more detailed rules, the stakeholders interviewed suggested that the organic farming 
legislation should put more emphasis on the liability of organic operators. Changes in the whole 
system should be well considered on the aspect of how much improvement can be achieved by 
more harmonisation.  
Even though half of the stakeholders (55 %) state that there is a need for flexibility due to 
regional differences, on average, they were quite neutral about this (mean 0.3). Processors 
(mean 1.1) and interviewees from Denmark (mean 1.1), Central and Eastern European countries9 
(mean 1.1) and the United Kingdom (mean 0.8) slightly agreed to the need for regional flexibility. 
Proponents consider that each Member State represents an own culture and tradition. 
Differences in the implementation of control rules could therefore sometimes be necessary as 
the situation in the Member States is different. Therefore, the EU organic farming legislation 
might not be able to be uniformly applied in each Member State. Stakeholders from France 
however were against regional flexibility in the control system (mean -1.2).  
Few differences were identified with regard to stakeholders’ view on the importance of different 
control measures to ensure fair competition. Stakeholders surveyed found an explicit sampling 
and testing policy (mean 1.8) to be an important means of ensuring fair competition among 
organic operators (see Table 8.4); to a slightly less extent than additional risk-based inspections 
(mean 2.3), systematic investigation and follow-up of detected residue cases (mean 2.3), 
mandatory annual inspections (mean 2.2) and definition of non-compliance and sanction 
categories (mean 2.1). There are no big differences in the opinions of the different stakeholder 
groups. Control bodies/control authorities, competent authorities and governmental authorities 
are more positive than the other stakeholders.  
                                                     
9  Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
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Table 8.4: Views of stakeholders regarding the importance of sampling and testing, 
systematic investigations and the definition of non-compliance and sanction 
categories to ensure fair competition (mean values) 
 
Source:  Own data from web-based stakeholder survey. 
Differences in the control system become a problem in cases when differences lead to unfair 
competition. Indeed, 78 % of the stakeholders surveyed (see Table 8.5) were of the opinion that 
differences in the implementation of the control rules lead to unfair competition between 
organic operators (mean 1.5). There are only minor differences between the stakeholder groups. 
However, Danish stakeholders were rather neutral (mean 0.6) whereas stakeholders from Italy 
(mean 2.1) and Poland (mean 2.0) supported this statement more strongly. The stakeholders in 
general slightly agreed to the statement that differences in the control system could disturb the 
functioning of the internal market (66 %, mean 1.0). Particularly retailers and importers (mean 
1.5 and 1.4, respectively) and stakeholders from Italy (mean 1.8) supported this statement more 
strongly whereas governmental authorities were rather neutral (mean 0.3). Interestingly, about 
25 % of the organic producers, 33 % of the processors, 50 % of the importers and 53 % of the 
retailers reported in the stakeholder survey that the competitiveness of their operation is or has 
been affected as a result of differences in the control systems of the Member States. 
Systematic investigation
compliance categories
Mean value n Mean value n Mean value n
Producer 2.1 16 2.5 16 1.9 16
Processor 1.1 9 2.0 9 1.6 9
Retailer 1.5 18 2.1 18 1.9 18
Importer 1.2 17 2.2 17 1.7 17
Organic Operator Organisations 1.3 33 2.0 33 1.9 33
Control Body/Control Authority 1.9 54 2.3 54 2.2 54
Competent Authority 2.2 22 2.6 22 2.4 22
Governmental Authority 1.8 16 2.4 16 2.1 16
Total 1.8 205 2.3 205 2.1 205
Question: How important are the following measures of the control system to ensure fair competition among organic operators 
(producers, processors etc.)?  (7-point Lickert scale, +3 = total agreement; 0 = neutral; -3 = total disagreement)
and follow-up of
detected residue cases
Definition of non-
and sanctionsfor control bodies
and testing policy
Explicit sampling
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Table 8.5:  Views of stakeholders regarding the differences in the control system between 
Member States (mean values) 
 
Source:  Own data web-based stakeholder survey. 
Scientific evidence 
The analysis of 2007-2009 data of control bodies/control authorities from the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom collected in the CERTCOST-project (Moschitz 
et al., 2009) revealed that the share of unannounced controls of all control visits varies 
considerably between both the five control bodies or control authorities respectively and the 
years 2007 to 2009. The share of unannounced controls thus amounted for the German control 
body 6.4 % in 2007 and increased to 19.1 % in 2009. In Denmark and in the United Kingdom, the 
share of unannounced controls was below 10 % while in Italy the share was around 10 % for the 
years 2007 to 2009. These results are confirmed by Zorn et al. (2010) who found considerable 
differences in the share of unannounced controls of nine German control bodies of 5.8 % to 
19.4 % (2006 data). 
It is worthwhile noting that Dabbert et al. (2012) concluded in the CERTCOST-project that there is 
a need to further clarify the definitions of ‘infringement’ and ‘irregularity’ with corresponding 
sanctions as well as to promote good practice. They recommend guidelines to create a 
harmonised system of sanctions to be applied under Article 30 in the event of infringements or 
irregularities (harmonised scales) in all Member States and by all control bodies. Regulation (EC) 
834/2007 uses the term “risk of occurrence of irregularities and infringements as regards 
compliance with the requirements laid down in this regulation” (Article 27). This has essentially 
the same meaning as the expression ‘risk of non-compliance’. However, a wider understanding of 
risk could include further aspects. Especially the size of the potential damage to the organic 
market and consumer trust is important (Dabbert et al., 2012).   
Differences in the
control system between 
EU Member States …
Mean value n=219 Mean value n=219 Mean value n=219
Producer 0.1 18 1.6 18 1.1 18
Processor 1.2 9 0.9 9 1.0 9
Retailer 0.1 19 1.7 19 1.5 19
Importer 0.2 18 1.3 18 1.4 18
Organic Operator Organisations 0.5 35 1.2 35 0.8 35
Control Body/Control Authority 0.1 58 1.6 58 0.9 58
Competent Authority 0.4 22 1.5 22 1.0 22
Governmental Authority 0.6 16 1.3 16 0.3 16
Total 0.3 1.5 1.0
Question: To which extent does the EU organic farming legislation meet its general aims with respect to the actual control 
procedures?  (7-point Lickert scale, +3 = total agreement; 0 = neutral; -3 = total disagreement)
to meet national
… are necessary
to fair competition
market and do not leadorganic operatorsconditions
of the EU internal
… disturb the functioning
competition between
… lead to unfair
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Furthermore, Dabbert (2011) concluded that the mandatory accreditation of control bodies has 
so far led only to a limited extent to a more harmonised supervision of the control system among 
Member States. He suggests a concerted action of accreditation bodies, e.g. by drawing up codes 
of Good Practice as encouraged by the EU Commission.10  
Adequacy of distribution of responsibilities among the main actors involved in the control 
system, including application of the accreditation system 
Findings from the analysis of provisions 
The basic distribution of responsibilities in the control system is defined in Article 27 of the 
Regulation (EC) 834/2007. Accordingly, Member States may designate one or more competent 
authorities responsible for controls in respect of the obligations established by the Regulation. 
The competent authority may confer its control competences to one or more other control 
authorities and/or delegate control tasks to one or more control bodies. In that case, the 
Member States has to designate authorities responsible for the approval and supervision of such 
bodies.  
For delegating control tasks to a particular control body, the Regulation requires among others 
that the control body is accredited to the most recently notified version of European Standard EN 
45011 or ISO Guide 65.  
Views of stakeholders (control bodies and competent authorities) 
The Spanish competent authority stressed that harmonization is required between Regulation 
(EC) 882/2004 and Regulation (EC) 834/2007 to better clarify the surveillance procedures that 
competent authorities should execute on control bodies and control authorities. The Regulation 
on organic farming should establish more clearly the control procedures the competent authority 
has to exert over the control authority. An Austrian control body highlighted that there should be 
only one national authority responsible for organic agriculture and no involvement of several 
authorities and public institutions. One Italian control body felt that there is no coordination 
between national and regional authorities, and that some regions even do not perform any 
supervisory activity. 
The stakeholder survey provided no indication that the distribution of responsibilities in the 
control system with respect to accreditation bodies is inadequate. Only one stakeholder from 
Denmark (scientist) mentioned that in Denmark the distribution of responsibilities between the 
control authority and the accreditation body needs to be clearer. 
                                                     
10  The European Cooperation for Accreditation (EA) has established a dedicated task force to foster harmonized 
supervision of the organic control system. A specific mandatory document for EA national accreditation bodies has 
been developed and approved in June 2013 (European Cooperation for Accreditation, 2013).  
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Findings from the fraud case analysis 
The fraud case ‘Gatto con gli stivali’ indicated that an inadequate distribution of responsibilities 
may hamper a quick information exchange. The fraud case was a penal procedure of the Italian 
tax investigation and details about this investigation were only available to the organic control 
system to the extent communicated by the prosecuting authority (Rohrdanz, 2012). There was no 
official interface ensuring that information on suspicious cases from, for example, the tax 
investigation is transmitted to authorities of the organic control system. Thus, the competent 
authorities of the possibly fraud-affected Member States had to rely on information from 
different actors of the organic sector which was often not very reliable and sometimes 
contradictory. Details on the fraud case are given in the subsequent section on ‘Information 
exchange between the actors involved in the control system’. 
Findings from the review of relevant publications 
Schulze et al. (2009) emphasize that an effective co-ordination between competent authorities, 
the accreditation body and the control bodies is needed to establish an effective and efficient 
control system.  
Adequacy of the public surveillance system in place  
Findings from the analysis of provisions and other information sources 
The public surveillance system encompasses the entire EU framework of activities of national 
competent authorities and accreditation bodies as described in the EU organic farming legislation 
to supervise and monitor the organic control system at the level of the control bodies. 
A key-element of the supervision of control bodies are office and witness audits11. In all case 
study countries with a system of private control bodies, the competent authorities conduct one 
office audit per year at the control body. However, the number of witness audits conducted by 
the competent authorities varies considerably between Member States. While in Austria, the 
Czech Republic, Spain and Germany the competent authority conduct 4 - 5 witness audits, and at 
least one in the United Kingdom, Bulgaria and Italy, so far no witness audits were conducted in 
Poland and Slovenia (Slovenia plans to do so in 2013). Own inspections of organic operators are 
conducted by the competent authority only in Austria (about 20 per year), Germany (about 20 
per year) and Poland. 
Views of stakeholder 
As far as the general assessment of the adequacy and effectiveness of the national approval and 
surveillance system for control bodies is concerned, all competent authorities of the 13 case 
                                                     
11  Witness audits are accompanied on-site inspection visits carried out by a competent authority with the aim to inspect 
(or audit) control bodies themselves.   
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study countries expressed that the system of their country is implemented adequately and 
effectively. The control bodies interviewed in Bulgaria, Estonia, France, the Netherlands, Poland 
and Slovenia were positive towards the surveillance system. However, five control bodies from 
Italy, Austria, the Czech Republic and from the United Kingdom considered the supervision 
system of the competent authority over the control bodies ineffective. The French control body 
considered the national supervision system to be effective through the double requirements of 
approval and accreditation12. In Germany, one competent authority and an organic sector 
organisation states that control effectiveness of the accreditation body over the control bodies 
could be improved. The Slovenian competent authority reports that the accreditation body is 
very strict, reliable and impartial. One control body from the United Kingdom and Portugal take 
the view that the accreditation body lacks technical competence in organic farming.  
Different assessments as regards the adequacy and effectiveness of the public surveillance 
system were not only expressed in the interviews but also in the web-based survey. The 
stakeholder survey showed that 47 % of the control bodies consider the supervision through the 
national competent authorities to be adequate to ensure the functioning of the control system 
(43 % do not agree). However, 73 % of control bodies from Italy and 60 % from Central and 
Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia) take the view that the supervision is not adequate and not functioning. 
There is criticism that the supervision of competent authorities focuses too much on formal 
requirements involving extensive reporting. On the other hand, the information collected seems 
often not to be used. An example is the collection procedures and use of statistical data. It is 
suggested that competent authorities should audit more frequently and thoroughly to ensure a 
really effective control system. 
The control bodies highlighted that some competent authorities are not endowed with the 
financial and human resources which would be required to do the supervision properly. This was 
particularly highlighted by stakeholders from the United Kingdom. Also in Austria, two control 
bodies found the personnel infrastructure of the competent authority insufficient. In this context 
also lacking competence of competent authority staff was mentioned. An Italian control body 
criticised that supervision in Italy was criticised for not being substantial enough and focused on 
documentary and bureaucratic information.  
Scientific evidence 
Zorn et al. (2012) compared the official data on sanctions reported from the German competent 
authority to the European Commission with the primary data of the issued sanctions from one 
German control body. They found mistakes in the reporting in the year 2008 due to careless 
reporting by the control body. Even though these mistakes were quite obvious, they were not 
                                                     
12  In accordance with Article 27(5)(c) of Council Regulation 834/2007 the control bodies are submitted to a double control 
to ensure that the minimum control requirements are applied: a) from the accreditation body (audit every 15 months) 
and b) from the competent authority (audit once a year).  
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noticed by both the control body and the competent authority. The authors conclude that the 
use of the supervision reports might be limited, possibly because of the data structure and 
quality. 
Information exchange between the actors involved in the control system 
Views of stakeholders 
The effectiveness of the organic control system is very much affected by the frequency of 
information exchange. About 78 % of control bodies meet more than twice a year and have 
established a continuous dialogue with the national competent authority (Austria, Belgium, Czech 
Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, and Sweden). Control 
bodies from Spain, Portugal and Slovakia meet twice a year while one control body from Spain 
and the United Kingdom exchange information with the competent authority only once a year. 
Responses from the control bodies in Germany and Italy are contradictory. For example, six 
German control bodies surveyed in the stakeholder survey stressed that there is a lot of 
information exchanged with the competent authorities via different information exchange 
platforms while one seems to have no information exchange at all. Similarly, while the 
‘coordination table’ initiated by the Italian Ministry of Agriculture was considered to be an 
effective tool for information exchange (more than twice a year) for nine control bodies, one 
control body responded to have no meeting at all with the Italian competent authority. In the 
case of Germany and Italy, this situation is probably due to the administrative structure of both 
countries with a national/federal competent authority and regional competent authorities. 
Actors of the organic control system use different approaches to exchange information. For 
cases of infringement a regulated information exchange already exists, the Organic Farming 
Information System (OFIS). In case of suspicion every Member State has the possibility of 
information exchange with other Member States. Interviews carried out with the competent 
authorities from the Czech Republic, Poland, the Netherlands and Italy revealed that information 
between Member States is exchanged during SCOF-meetings and by personal contacts with peers 
(Czech Republic, Italy, Poland and the Netherlands). SCOF is considered to be effective and 
helpful for information exchange. The Slovenian competent authority considers the OFIS 
database enables quick exchange of information between Member States. Control bodies in 
Austria, Germany, France, and Spain established institutionally quite intense communication 
through national associations of control bodies. But also Czech, Polish, Slovenian and UK control 
bodies meet regularly. The Estonian control body interviewed pointed out that information 
exchange has improved while the Bulgarian control bodies have only contact via e-mail. 
Competent authorities from Italy and Spain criticised that communication between the national 
authorities and the regional competent authority is not effectively organised. In Spain, the 
regional authorities who implement the EU legislation seem to have no established 
communication and information exchange platform. A German control body complained that 
they do not have sufficient access to relevant official data sources, which could be used to 
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prepare the control visit and allow them to focus during the on-site inspection on more relevant 
issues. 
Findings from the review of relevant publications 
The European Court of Auditors (2012) found in two Member States visited that the information 
flow between the control system for organic production and for policy support under the agri-
environment measures to be insufficient. In France, the results of the checks made by the control 
bodies were not communicated to the paying agency for the agri-environment subsidies. The 
Court of Auditors concluded that there is the risk that non-compliances affecting the conditions 
for receiving agri-environment payments, detected by a control body, do not result in a reduction 
or recovery of the payment. Likewise, in the United Kingdom they found no reverse flow of 
information and the risk that non-compliances concerning organic farming practices detected by 
the paying agency as a result of their inspections do not result in sanctions imposed by the 
control body. 
Results of the fraud case analysis 
The fraud case ’Gatto con gli stivali‘ was until now one of the largest fraud cases in the EU 
concerning organic products covered by the EU legislation on organic production. The press 
release of the Italian Guardia di Finanza (tax investigation) reported on a volume of 
approximately 703.000 tons of false-labelled conventional products sold as organic and  financial 
damage estimated at around 220 million EUR, representing approximately 10 % of the total 
turnover of the Italian organic market. The subsequent analysis is based on the results of the Anti 
Fraud Initiative (AFI) seminar in Italy as well as personal interviews with actors involved in the 
fraud case and an evaluation of correspondence exchanged between competent authorities and 
control bodies. 
According to FederBio (2012), mainly from 2007 to 2009, a network of at least 20 fraudulent 
operators sold conventional products produced in Italy and Romania as organic to several EU 
Member States (mainly Austria, Belgium, France, Hungary, the Netherlands, Spain and 
Switzerland). The fake products were cereals (barley, rye, spelt, wheat), corn, sorghum, flax, 
peas, faba beans, soybeans, canola, sunflowers and mashed apples.  
The fraudulent trade companies supported by two employees of the largest Italian control body 
’changed‘ the conventional status of the commodities to organic by  
 fudging conformity certificates (documentary evidences according to Article 29 of Regulation 
(EC) 834/2007), the production plan (according to Article 71 of Regulation (EC) 889/2008), 
proofs of land ownership and tenancy agreements, contracts as well as delivery notes and 
invoices; and 
 fudging of invoices of commercial transactions which never happened in reality. 
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Due to the missing international verification of conformity certificates and bookkeeping 
documents through cross checks, the detection of the fraud was difficult for control bodies. 
Furthermore, the fraudulent activities were facilitated by multiple certifications of organic 
operators. The Italian organic operators involved in the fraud were often inspected by different 
control bodies for different activities. Indeed, one of the main actors in the fraud case, the Italian 
company Sunny Land S.P.A., was inspected by two control bodies: one controlled the 
trading/processing activities while the other one controlled the import activities.  
The fraud case came to light during an inspection conducted by the Italian tax investigations at 
the trading company Sunny Land. As a consequence of the inspection, the Italian tax investigation 
started broad examinations of various trading companies and control bodies which lasted for 
more than one year. Italian competent authorities as well as several control bodies were involved 
in these investigations, but they were bound to secrecy. During the tax investigation, in May 
2011, Sunny Land changed to another control body. However, the original control body 
confirmed the organic status of Sunny Land to the one that took over without informing about 
the on-going investigations of the Italian tax police and the suspicion of fraud. The fraud case 
went public with a press conference of the Italian tax investigation (Comando Provinciale Guardia 
di Finanza Verona) on 6 December 2011. This press conference immediately attracted the 
interest of the large international news agencies distributing the information internationally. 
However, no information was distributed by the Italian Ministry for Agriculture, waiting for 
official information from the judicial authority and Italian tax investigation. Thus, information 
about the Italian fraud case came to competent authorities of the possibly fraud-affected 
Member States through press publications and by different actors of the organic sector and not 
through information exchange procedures of the organic control system. For example in 
Germany, the fraud news was delivered to the competent authority by a German control body, 
which in turn was informed by an Italian control body. Thus, there was no official communication 
to the actors of the organic control system.  
On 9 December 2011, the Italian Ministry for Agriculture confirmed the press release of the 
Italian tax investigation to the European Commission and to competent authorities of the other 
Member States. Ten days later, after a consultation between the and the Member States, the 
competent authorities of the Member States informed the national control bodies providing a list 
of companies possibly involved in the fraud, a product list and a preliminary list of commercial 
transactions from Italian trading companies to their direct clients in the Member States. However 
at that time, the EU-clients of the Italian fraudulent companies had already sold most fraudulent 
lots to other companies. Moreover, most of the 20 trading companies on the list had already left 
the organic control system. The situation of voluntary sales withdrawal of Italian companies from 
the control system, the suspensions, police investigations and sales to further EU-clients, made 
the traceability of the falsified lots very complex. To conclude, deficiencies in the information 
exchange were one key problem of the ’Gatto con gli stivali‘ fraud case. The case study revealed 
deficiencies at following levels:  
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Active phase of the fraud case 
Control bodies and control authorities: 
  Missing information exchange according to Article 31 Regulation (EC) 834/2007 relating to 
the authenticity of conformity certificates (documentary evidences) issued by other control 
bodies, of contracts, of invoices and of delivery notes through cross checks; 
  Missing information exchange according to Article 31 Regulation (EC) 834/2007 relating to 
the parallel certification of one operator by different control bodies; 
  Missing information exchange according to Article 31 Regulation (EC) 834/2007 relating to 
operators changing the control body; 
 Missing centralised internet publication of conformity certificates (documentary evidences). 
Phase after publication of the fraud 
Control bodies and control authorities: 
  Missing information exchange according to Article 31 Regulation (EC) 834/2007 relating to 
the fraud facts identified during the co-operation with the Italian tax investigation. 
Competent authorities:  
 Deficiencies on ensuring a co-ordinated approach and quick information exchange to identify 
and to report operators and lots affected by the fraudulent activities on the  national level; 
  Deficiencies on ensuring a co-ordinated approach and quick information exchange to identify 
and to report operators and lots affected by the fraudulent activities between EU-Member 
States. 
Information exchange between control bodies as well as between control bodies and competent 
authorities was one of the key deficiencies complicating a quick seizure of potentially non-
compliant organic products in the Member States. 
Consumers’ confidence in the organic control system 
Results of the consumer survey 
Regarding consumer trust in the actors of the organic sector the consumer survey reveals that 
respondents do trust but their confidence is not very pronounced (see Table 8.6).  
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Table 8.6:  Mean values of extent of trust in different actors or institutions in different 
countriesa 
 
Source:  Own data from consumer survey. 
There is no clear picture whether consumers prefer publicly or privately organised controls of 
organic operators (see Table 8.7). Consumers agree that stricter control rules are needed. 
Furthermore, they would appreciate the publication of control results from organic operators on 
the internet. 
Table 8.7: Mean values of extent of confidence in control bodies and rules in different 
countries 
 
Source:  Own data from consumer survey. 
All DE EE FR IT PL UK
Mean 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.9 1.0
n 2805 478 443 472 484 477 451
Mean 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1
n 2841 482 449 473 490 477 470
Mean 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.4 1.0 0.3 0.7
n 2799 468 442 463 491 469 466
Mean 1.1 0.9 1.1 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.2
n 2722 452 430 458 484 467 431
Mean 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.5 1.0 0.9 0.8
n 2849 477 455 475 493 481 468
Mean 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.7
n 2752 476 443 453 474 471 435
Organic processors
Question:  Considering organic products, to which extent do you trust the following actors or institutions? ( 7-point Lickert scale, +3 = 
very high confidence, 0 = neutral, -3 = no confidence) 
Inspectors controlling organic farms 
and processors
Organic farmer
The supermarket where you usually 
buy organic products
The organic food shop where you 
usually buy organic products
Organic labels
All DE EE FR IT PL UK
Mean 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.7 1.4 1.3
n 2736 472 431 447 485 463 438
Mean 1.1 0.9 1.7 0.9 0.6 1.5 1.2
n 2762 464 452 451 481 462 452
Mean 1.6 2.0 1.2 1.6 1.9 1.6 1.1
n 2707 485 408 464 484 456 410
Mean 1.9 2.1 2.0 1.7 2.0 2.1 1.5
n 2852 489 466 470 491 479 457
The ‘organic’ inspections should be done 
by public institutions/authorities
Organic’ inspection of farms should be 
done by independent private inspectors
Stricter control rules are needed
Control results from organic operators 
should be published in the internet
 Question: Do you think the government or the European Commission should be more active to maintain or increase trust in organic 
products? Please indicate to which extent you agree to the following statements. (7-point Lickert scale, +3 = very high confidence, 0 = 
neutral, -3 = no confidence) 
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Views of stakeholders 
The question whether the control system is adequate or not to ensure consumer protection was 
also addressed in the stakeholder survey. In total, 81 % of the surveyed stakeholders consider the 
organic control system to be highly effective in ensuring consumer protection. As very important 
are seen: mandatory annual inspections (83 %), additional risk inspection (80 %) and systematic 
and follow up investigation (82 %). According to the stakeholder survey, the following control 
aspects are less important for ensuring consumer confidence: no differences in the control 
system of the Member States (69 %), an explicit sampling and residue testing policy (63 %) and 
the definition of non-compliance categories and sanctions (66 %). 
Scientific evidence 
A research study from Germany (Stolz et al., 2011) showed that organic consumers had a high 
level of trust in organic inspectors and organic farmers. Trust in organic labels and in organic 
processors was significantly lower than consumer trust in organic inspectors and organic farmers. 
Results of the CERTCOST project (Janssen and Hamm, 2011) revealed that organic consumers 
from the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany and Italy trust organic certification schemes in 
particular. Trust in organic certification systems was largely intertwined with perceived stricter 
control and familiarity with the organic logo. Consumers however have a low level of factual 
knowledge about organic production standards and the organic control system (Janssen and 
Hamm, 2012). This is also confirmed by research from Sawyer et al. (2009), McEachern and 
Warnaby (2008) and Hoogland et al. (2007).  
8.4 Judgement and conclusions 
Based on the results presented in the section above, it is concluded that the overall control 
system of organic farming is largely adequate in terms of achieving the global objectives of the 
Regulation, but with some shortcomings as regards its implementation, taking the following 
into account: 
 Annual inspection requirements are adequate to ensure fair competition and consumer 
confidence, although risk-based approaches could achieve the same aims at lower costs. 
However, guidance at EU level may be necessary to ensure a harmonised approach. 
 Additional risk-based inspections required by the Regulation are in general an adequate tool 
to ensure fair competition and consumer confidence. However, they are implemented 
differently across the Member States and in several countries only to a limited extent. At 
present, the full potential of risk-based approaches is not exploited. Further development of 
risk-based approaches is necessary so that they can be applied to the organic control system. 
 Exemption from the control system for operators who sell products directly to the final 
consumer or user are adequate and justified in cases where such operators only sell packed 
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and labelled food. In such cases, the upstream actors of the organic supply chain were already 
subject to the control system. However, there is an indication that this exemption is only 
justified if the supervision system ensures that such retail businesses are notified to the 
respective competent authorities and that the conditions for the exemption are periodically 
verified.  
 Not all elements of the control system are consistently implemented across the Member 
States. This leads to a situation whereby, between Member States and even within one 
Member State, organic operators and products could be differently evaluated with respect to 
residues, and also operators could receive different sanctions for committing the same 
infringement. Thus for these areas, fair competition among organic operators and among 
control bodies cannot be not guaranteed. 
 There is no robust indication that the distribution of responsibilities among the main actors 
involved in the control system is inadequate. 
 The national supervision systems are not fully adequately and effectively implemented in 
some Member States due to insufficient procedures for supervision and limited resources of 
competent authorities to fulfil the supervisory role. 
 There are some deficiencies in the exchange of information illustrated by the analysis of the 
recent organic fraud case. 
 Consumers largely have confidence in the organic control system. But this trust is built upon 
perceptions and not on factual knowledge. 
Detailed considerations 
The aim of Evaluation Question 3 is to evaluate to what extent the overall control system of 
organic farming, from the Commission, through Member States competent authorities, control 
authorities, control bodies and accreditation bodies, has been adequate to achieve the global 
objectives of the Regulation. If the control system does not effectively ensure full compliance 
with the rules across all Member States a) fair competition among organic farmers within the EU 
and b) consumers’ confidence in organic products is not guaranteed. Therefore, it is particularly 
relevant to assess the functioning of the control system by evaluating whether or not the 
established processes and practices do lead to unfair competition or barriers to the production 
and marketing of organic products. The marketing of organic products would also be distorted if 
consumers’ confidence in organic products was not ensured. 
The judgement is based on documentary analyses (cross-country comparison) of the control 
procedures that have been implemented, interviews with national competent authorities and 
control bodies from 13 Member States, the case study results from the ’Gatto con gli stivali‘ fraud 
case, data from the CERTCOST-project, the consumer survey, and the review of  scientific 
literature and public documents. An important information basis was the stakeholder survey 
which was responded to by 265 European stakeholders. 
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Adequacy of the annual inspection requirements 
Annual inspection requirements are adequate to ensure fair competition and consumer 
confidence. But risk-based approaches could achieve the same aims at lower costs.  
There was consent between all stakeholder groups surveyed that mandatory annual inspections 
are important measures to ensure fair competition among organic operators and to ensure 
consumer confidence in organic products. Indeed, mandatory annual inspection is often used in 
the organic sector to demonstrate the integrity and authenticity of organic products to the 
consumer. It seems to be a convincing argument which is easy to communicate to the consumer: 
organic operators are inspected every year. Scientific literature shows that consumer trust is 
connected to the perceived strictness of the standards and regular controls. However, scientific 
literature also reveals that consumers have a very limited knowledge about the organic control 
system. Consumers have trust in the actors or logos rather than in specific elements of the 
organic inspection system. For consumers it is important that the certification process is 
trustworthy and that it ensures compliance. According to scientific literature, control bodies 
comply with the requirements of the Regulation of at least one annual control plus additional 
random controls. However, the share of unannounced controls varies considerably between 
control bodies and the Member States. 
Scientific literature shows that the amount of the certification fee is not marginal, does matter to 
organic operators and loads the consumer price for organic products by around 1 %. As 
certification costs are particularly determined by the number of on-site controls, those could be 
reduced by reducing the number of on-site control visits for instance by strengthening risk-based 
inspection approaches. Scientific literature so far provides no evidence that annual inspections 
are the prerequisite for high detection rates of non-compliances. However, there is a body of 
literature suggesting that risk-based approaches ensure non-opportunistic behaviour of 
operators. There is evidence that the probability of non-compliance is higher for operators who 
have already been non-compliant and low for operators who are compliant.  
In contrast to the annual visit of each organic operator, other areas work with considerably lower 
control frequencies. For example, the EU legal framework for the rural development programmes 
requires annual on-the-spot checks of 5 % of all beneficiaries (which could be halved under 
certain conditions).  
Adequacy of the additional risk-based inspection 
Risk-based inspections are in general an adequate tool to ensure fair competition and consumer 
confidence. But the application of additional risk-based inspection is done differently and to a 
limited extent in the Member States. 
There was consent between all groups of stakeholders surveyed that additional risk-based 
inspections are important measures to ensure fair competition among organic operators. In line 
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with the provisions of Article 27(3) of Regulation (EC) 834/2007 and Article 65(4) of Regulation 
(EC) 889/2008 control bodies should apply systematic risk assessments of their operators against 
risk factors linked to the nature of their operation. However, the documentary analysis showed 
that not all Member States have established national guidelines for risk-based inspection and 
thus risk-based inspection is done differently and used to different extent across the Member 
States. This is confirmed by both, stakeholder responses and scientific literature which highlights 
that there is no harmonised understanding of what criteria for risk-based inspection could be 
used and how exactly risk analysis should be carried out. 
There is broad consent among the stakeholders surveyed and interviewed and in scientific 
literature that risk-based inspection could a) improve the organic control system considerably 
and b) reduce the certification costs for organic operators as a result of reducing the number of 
on-site control visits for low-risk operators. Scientific literature suggests comprehensive and 
dynamic risk-based approaches which determine auditing intervals, auditing depth, unannounced 
spot checks and differentiated auditing focuses, cross-checks along the entire supply chain and 
targeted sampling and testing. These suggestions from research go beyond the currently used 
approaches for additional risk-based inspection and still need to be further developed so that 
they can be used in the organic control system. Furthermore, such dynamic approaches are not 
compatible with static approaches like mandatory annual control visits. Thus the full potential of 
risk-based approaches is currently not used in the organic control system. 
Adequacy and justification of Article 28(2) of Council Regulation (EC) 834/2007 which allows 
Member States to exempt operators who sell products directly to the final consumer or user from 
the control system 
Exemptions from the control system for operators who sell products directly to the final 
consumer or user are adequate and justified in cases where such operators only sell packed and 
labelled food.  
Article 28(2) of Council Regulation (EC) 834/2007 enables Member States to exempt retail 
operators who sell products directly to the final consumer or user from the control system if 
these retail operators do not produce, process, pack, label or store organic products elsewhere, 
do not import organic products from third countries and/or outsource these activities to a third 
party. All 13 case study countries use this article and exempt retailers which sell packed and 
labelled food. The results of the web-based survey showed that stakeholder views vary whether 
retailers should be exempted from the control system or not. Opponents, particularly producers 
and control bodies/control authorities, favour the inclusion of the retail sector in the control 
system to a large extent because retailers are in direct contact with the consumers and therefore 
have a particular responsibility to ensure consumer confidence. However, both stakeholder 
groups might have vested interests (non-exclusion of the perceived most powerful actor, 
principle of same requirements for all, business opportunity for control bodies if all actors of the 
supply chain are included). A few stakeholders mentioned the risk of commingling organic 
products with conventional products and incorrect labelling. However, 19 stakeholders (among 
Chapter 8 Adequacy of the overall control system 159 
 
them 6 control bodies, 3 competent authorities, and 2 national authorities) take the view that 
retail of packed food does not bear any risk of commingling and incorrect labelling. In cases 
where retailers sell packed and labelled food, the upstream actors of the organic supply chain are 
subject to the control system. Additional controls of retailers which sell the packed and labelled 
food may increase costs for the retailers but might neither increase consumer confidence nor fair 
competition among organic operators.  
This view is supported by the only research study identified in this context (Neuendorff, 2012) 
which argues that there is a low risk of commingling with conventional products and incorrect 
labelling on the basis of 2005-2011 inspection data of one German control body. 
The German study by Neuendorff (2013), on the other hand, showed one problem which was not 
raised by stakeholders: Retailers which start preparation or processing activities and which do 
not submit their activities to the control system as required could be rarely identified and 
penalized by the competent authorities. Thus, the exemption of retailers selling only packed and 
labelled food is only justified and adequate if the supervision system of the Member States can 
ensure that such retail businesses are notified and the conditions are periodically verified. 
Level of harmonization/consistency in the Member State’s procedures of setting-up national 
control systems and the differences in the control procedures 
The results of the documentary analyses in the case study countries, the stakeholder survey and 
research results indicate that not all elements of the control system are consistently 
implemented in the Member States. 
The documentary analysis conducted in the case study countries identified areas which are 
regulated differently in the Member States, namely risk-based inspections, residue sampling, 
testing and analysis, issuing of sanctions, and accreditation processes for control bodies. 
Furthermore, the review of scientific literature identified differences in the number of 
unannounced controls. These areas were also mentioned by the stakeholders.  
All stakeholder groups agreed that an explicit sampling and testing policy for control bodies and 
the definition of sanction categories contribute to ensure fair competition. However, Denmark, 
Germany, Italy and Slovenia were the only countries of the 13 case study countries where residue 
sampling and analysis of organic products is statutorily regulated, which in turn leaves in all 
Member States without statutory requirements the procedure for testing and analysis at the 
responsibility of the control bodies. Similarly, only four of 13 national case studies defined the 
issuing of sanctions according to Article 30 of Regulation (EC) 834/2007 (Germany, Estonia, the 
Czech Republic and the Netherlands). This leads to the situation that between Member States 
and in the case of regional implementation even within a Member State a) organic operators and 
products are evaluated differently with respect to residue testing and b) operators could be 
sanctioned differently for having committed the same infringement. For these areas, fair 
competition among organic operators may not be ensured. Difference in the control procedures 
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can also lead to unfair competition between control bodies within a Member State. This involves 
the risk that the way control procedures are implemented could influence operators’ control 
body choice and might cause differences in the certification fees (risk of race to the bottom). 
Research results and stakeholders suggest introducing a harmonised system for issuing sanctions. 
However, it is challenging to define non-compliance and sanctions in a uniform way without 
losing the flexibility required for acknowledging the specific context of each case, which in turn 
could also lead to unfair competition among organic operators. 
The need for harmonisation of control processes   between accreditation bodies across Member 
States was only highlighted by three German stakeholders (two competent authorities, one 
organic sector organisation). A similar conclusion was also drawn by Dabbert (2011) who argued 
in the CERTCOST-project that the effectiveness of mandatory accreditation on harmonised 
supervision procedures seems to be quite limited. 
As far as residue testing and analysis is concerned, on the one hand stakeholders strongly 
demand a common EU framework, while at the same time there is also a great uncertainty 
between the Member States and within the organic sector as to how and to what extent residue 
testing and analysis should be regulated in the EU organic farming legislation. This contradiction 
might be due to two reasons: First, mandatory residue testing conflicts with the process oriented-
approach of organic farming. As there is no scientific technology at hand which allows the 
unambiguous identification of whether a product has been produced in compliance with the 
organic rules or not, process orientated control is indispensable. In case of doubt, residue testing 
could provide evidence about the use of unauthorised substances. Second, there is a 
controversial discussion surrounding the question whether the introduction of thresholds on 
pesticide residues make sense or not. The supporters argue for clear criteria for control bodies to 
decide whether there may be breaches of the organic regulations or any irregularity. However, 
opponents argue that in a world of increasingly quickly degrading and prohibited pesticides, the 
introduction of a threshold would lead to the non-identification of prohibited pesticide 
applications and thus undermine organic integrity. 
This conflict between setting clear rules and leaving flexibility to the Member States is also 
reflected in the results of the stakeholder survey. Particularly stakeholders from Denmark, 
Central and Eastern European countries and from the United Kingdom were slightly in favour of 
regional flexibility in the control system. Differences in the implementation of control rules might 
be necessary to acknowledge the different conditions for agriculture in the Member States. 
Stakeholders voiced the risk that the EU organic farming legislation regulates too much and does 
not leave enough space for effective controls.  
However, to ensure fair competition, the implemented control procedures have to lead to the 
same result which is compliance with organic rules and comparable levels of sanction for similar 
severity of infringement. With respect to the areas identified where the control system does not 
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seem to be uniformly implemented in the Member States (residue sampling, testing and analysis, 
risk-based approaches, share of unannounced controls, and issuing of sanctions) there might be 
different ways to ensure that the control rules will lead to the same results. Therefore there is 
the need to distinguish carefully between a) areas where harmonisation needs to be achieved 
through more detailed and mandatory rules, b) areas which where providing general guidelines 
or a common framework would be sufficient, or c) areas which could be easily harmonized by 
providing information or information exchange platforms. 
Adequacy of distribution of responsibilities among the main actors involved in the control system, 
including application of the accreditation system 
There is no robust indication that the distribution of responsibilities among the main actors 
involved in the control system, including in respect of accreditation, is inadequate.  
One Austrian control body, one Spanish competent authority and one Italian control body 
pointed out deficiencies in the responsibilities among actors involved in the control system. They 
mentioned scattered responsibilities between different national authorities, not well-defined 
links between the surveillance activities of competent authorities and accreditation. Due to the 
fact that these deficiencies were mentioned by only three interviewees and that these 
deficiencies were not raised in the stakeholder survey, the information basis is considered to be 
too weak to draw any conclusions. Only one Danish stakeholder mentioned deficiencies in the 
distribution of responsibilities accreditation bodies. Thus, there is no indication that distribution 
of responsibilities with accreditation bodies is an issue.  
The ’Gatto con gli stivali‘ fraud case identified a problem related to allocation of responsibilities: 
detailed information about suspicious fraudulent organic actors identified by the tax investigation 
was not transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture, as the competent authority. This might point 
to the general problem that information on fraud cases detected by other actors cannot not be 
used by the actors of the organic control system.  
Public surveillance system 
The public surveillance system encompasses the entire EU framework of activities of national 
competent authorities and accreditation bodies as described in the EU organic farming legislation 
to supervise and monitor the organic control system at the level of the control bodies. The 
national supervision system is not adequately and effectively implemented in some Member 
States. 
All competent authorities interviewed in the 13 case study countries indicated that the national 
approval and surveillance system is appropriate in the respective country and control bodies 
interviewed in France, the Netherlands, Poland, Bulgaria, Estonia and Slovenia were positive 
about the national surveillance system. Furthermore, also the French and German control body 
reported that the national supervision system is effective through the double requirements of 
approval by the competent authority and accreditation through the national accreditation body.  
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The positive view is however only partly confirmed by the results of the stakeholder survey. For 
example, 60 % of the control bodies from Central and Eastern European countries and 73 % of 
Italian control bodies responding to the survey mentioned that national supervision is not fully 
adequate and functioning. Furthermore, the control bodies interviewed in Italy, Austria, the 
Czech Republic and the United Kingdom considered the supervision system of the competent 
authority over the control bodies not to be fully effective. Moreover, several control bodies 
argued that the competent authorities of two Member States are not endowed with the financial 
and human resources that would be required to do the supervision properly and that the 
competent authority staff lack competence. While in the case study countries all competent 
authorities interviewed conduct annual office audits, only a limited number of witness audits 
were conducted in the United Kingdom, Bulgaria, and Italy and no witness audits were conducted 
in Poland and Slovenia. Only a German competent authority and organic sector organisation 
stated that control effectiveness of the accreditation bodies over the control bodies could be 
improved whereas the Slovenian competent authority reports that the accreditation body is very 
strict, reliable and impartial. Lack of technical competence in organic farming of accreditors was 
mentioned by two stakeholders from the United Kingdom and Portugal. The ’Gatto con gli stivali‘ 
fraud case study identified deficiencies in the on-site supervision of control bodies due to for 
instance ineffective control procedures or not controlling the right sections of an organic 
enterprise. The varying number of witness audits and the deficiencies identified in the fraud case 
might be due to the above-mentioned limited resources of competent authorities. 
Furthermore, the stakeholder survey revealed that the information collected from competent 
authorities for supervision is often not used. Research found one case of obvious incorrect 
reporting by a German control body which was neither detected by the control body nor by the 
competent authority. This also indicates that at least some competent authorities do not check 
the information provided for supervision purposes carefully or do not use the information. The 
stakeholder survey and research suggest that this might be due to data structure and quality.  
In some Member States the information collected in the course of supervision activities was 
reported to be not substantial and too focused on formal requirements, thus the information 
might not be useful for supervision. Also the European Court of Auditors (2012) observed 
insufficient procedures for supervision in some Member States.  
Even though these might be single cases the findings presented about public surveillance system 
give an indication that some competent authorities may not fully fulfil their supervisory role over 
the control bodies. Supervision of control bodies is an important means to ensure both fair 
competition and consumer confidence. In some Member States, the implementation of the 
national supervision seems not to ensure these. 
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Information exchange between the actors involved in the control system 
There are some deficiencies in the exchange of information illustrated by the fraud case study. 
The stakeholder interviews showed that a continuous and mostly institutionalised information 
exchange is established between the control bodies at national level in most case-study 
countries. Furthermore, the control bodies indicated in the web-based survey that there is an 
established continuous dialogue between the control bodies and the competent authorities in 
most countries. 
However, the results from the ’Gatto con gli stivali‘ fraud case study highlighted deficiencies in 
information exchange which at least facilitated the fraud. First, there was a lack of information 
exchange between different national control bodies controlling different areas of the same 
operator. Furthermore, there were two different control bodies involved in the process and there 
was also a lack of information exchange between the original control body and the one that took 
over later. Thus, even though there seems to be an established dialogue between control bodies 
in Italy, in this specific case, no procedures were effective in ensuring information exchange to 
impede fraud. Second, information exchange was lacking between control bodies active in 
different Member States which made it difficult to prove the authenticity of certificates. Finally, 
information exchange between competent authorities to identify and to report operators and 
lots affected by the fraudulent activities on the national level was too slow so that the fraudulent 
lots were already sold and thus could not be taken from the organic market. Thus, information 
exchange across competent authorities in the affected Member States did not function in the 
actual fraud case.  
Deficiencies in the exchange of information have also been revealed by the European Court of 
Auditors (European Court of Auditors, 2012). The court found in two Member States which have 
been visited that the information flow between the control system for organic production and for 
policy support under the agri-environment measures to be insufficient. This again stresses the 
lacking of interfaces between actors of the control system and, in this case, actors responsible for 
agri-environmental schemes. 
Consumers’ confidence in the organic control system 
Consumers largely have confidence in the organic control system. 
The consumer survey revealed that consumers trust largely in the actors of the organic control 
system but their trust is not very pronounced. This is confirmed through scientific literature 
showing a high level of consumer trust in inspectors controlling organic operators, which is 
significantly higher than consumer trust in organic labels. However, there is evidence from 
various researches that consumers’ knowledge about the organic control system is very limited. 
Stakeholders perceive the procedures of the control system to be effective to ensure consumer 
trust, even though consumers have almost no knowledge about these procedures. Trust is built 
upon perceptions and not on factual knowledge which might be due to lacking or not tailored 
consumer information about organic farming and its control system.  
